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FOCUSED DISCUSSION PEER-REVIEWED
Otto in the Chinese Room∗
Philip McCullough†
The purpose of this paper is to explore a possible resolution to
one of the main objections to machine thought as propounded
by Alan Turing in the imitation game that bears his name. That
machines will, at some point, be able to think is the central idea of
this text, a claim supported by a schema posited by Andy Clark and
David Chalmers in their paper, “The Extended Mind” (1998). Their
notion of active externalism is used to support, strengthen, and
further what John Searle calls “the systems reply” to his objection
to machine thought or strong Artificial Intelligence in his Chinese
Room thought experiment. Relevant objections and replies to these
objections are considered, then some conclusions about machine
thought and the Turing Test are examined.
...I believe that at the end of the century the use of words and
general educated opinion will have altered so much that one will
be able to speak of machines thinking without expecting to be
contradicted.
A. M. Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence (1950)
In any case, once the hegemony of skin and skull is usurped,
we may be able to see ourselves more truly as creatures of the
world.
Andy Clark and David Chalmers, “The Extended Mind” (1998)
INTRODUCTION
Although his chronology may have been off slightly, Turing has proved
to be a sagacious visionary. Words such as those quoted above bring
machine thought closer to common acceptance. The topic of this paper
began with the intent to compare and contrast content internalism and
content externalism. However, upon closer scrutiny, the externalist side of
∗ Received 26 January 2010. Revised paper accepted 5 July 2010.
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interests include the importance of subjectivity to mental content in the context of the
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the equation, specifically the notion of active externalism promulgated by
Clark and Chalmers began to loom large in my thinking about other ideas
in the philosophy of mind, including the Turing Test and its well-known
refutation proposed by John Searle in the form of the Chinese Room
thought experiment. Suddenly, I saw my image of the mansion of the mind
in sharp relief. It was as if I had been sitting in one of the mansion’s unlit
rooms and a light had been switched on. I could see in a basket labelled
“number one,” the characters “理解.” I imagined searching the Internet for
this and discovering it to be the Chinese pictograph for “comprehension:”
the active externalism advocated by Clark and Chalmers circumvents the
argument advanced by Searle, the Chinese Room thought experiment,
against the Turing Test.
Following this line of thought, I will argue that machines can (or perhaps
in some sense already do) think. Whether they are cognizant depends
upon how one operationalizes the definition of “mind.” At the end of
the previous century, two scholars proposed a definition that deviates
enough from the traditional concept so as to suggest, albeit not explicitly,
that certain machines already fit into the parameters delineated by this
definition. I will briefly outline these ideas from Clark and Chalmers and
show how their ideas regarding active externalism, by extending mind out
to the environment, imply a theory that, if accepted, is devastating to one of
the most important objections to the Turing Test, Searle’s Chinese Room.
If the mind is extended into or coupled with the environment, then the man
in the room in the thought experiment does in some sense understand the
story being told in Searle’s parable. In this paper, I will proceed as follows:
in §I, I will give a broad overview of the issues and players involved; in §II,
I will detail my argumentation; in §III I examine some possible objections
and give my replies to them; and finally, in §IV, I will attempt to draw some
further conclusions.
Clark and Chalmers conclude in “The Extended Mind” that “there are
obvious consequences for philosophical views of the mind” (1998, 18); if
active externalism is a stone thrown into the reasonably calm waters of
intellectual thought, this paper explores but one of the ripples it caused.
There will surely be other ripples on the waters of thought, since active
externalism facilitates new ways of understanding pivotal notions such
as belief, information, and self-identity. Nor will these ripples reach only
the abstract and deep waters of cognitive science but will continue to
make themselves felt upon more distant shores, such as morality and
interpersonal relationships.
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I.
The central problem of the internalism/externalism dialectic is whether
semantic content is at all contingent upon environmental factors. Putnam
advances what has been called a passive externalist theory in his article
“The Meaning of ‘Meaning’” (1975). Putnam begins with an exploration of
the nature of intension and extension. To this end, he presents his now
famous “Twin Earth” thought experiment. He asks the reader to imagine
another planet where everything is identical to Earth except that water,
although perceptually identical, has a different chemical structure, XYZ,
from the molecular structure of water, H2O. Hence one cannot tell the
difference conceptually to what we call water here and what is called
water on the other planet (water2) without reference to environmental
factors since both appear exactly the same to our senses. This is meant
to illustrate a position often referred to as externalism, in which certain
intentional mental states are contingent upon a subject being in a certain
relationship to the environment. In contrast, internalism is the notion that
such mental states depend solely upon the internal constitution of an
individual.
In “The Extended Mind” Clark and Chalmers postulate an alternative to
the externalist/internalist dyad which they call active externalism. A thought
experiment involving problem solving using a computer suggests the world
is an intrinsic part of cognitive tasks, a position they wish to set apart
from Putnam and others such as Tyler Burge,1 who they label passive
externalists because they only claim passive semantic aspects such as
historical or distal factors make the water different from water2. The authors
call their third position active externalism because the relevant external
semantic factors in their paradigm are actively coupled with cognition.
Furthermore, not only do cognitive processes extend into the world, the
mind does as well. An example used by Clark and Chalmers is the belief
that the Museum of Modern Art (MOMA) is on 53rd Street. Most people
would just rely on their native memory to believe this. However, consider
Otto, a person with Alzheimer’s disease who is unable to remember from
day to day the location of the museum; he must write it down in a notebook.
Clark and Chalmers write “it seems reasonable to say that Otto believed
the museum was on 53rd Street even before consulting his notebook”
(Clark and Chalmers 1998, 13). He still believes that he knows where the
museum is even though he must consult his notebook for this knowledge.
In this manner, Otto and his notebook become a coupled system; the
notebook, in this view, becomes a part of his mind. Should a twin Otto
1 Burge, while having similar ideas to Putnam, attempts to discern a difference between
“broad” and “narrow” mental content, a subtlety beyond the scope of this article.
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(Twotto) on Twin Earth incorrectly jot in his notebook that MOMA is on 51st
Street, then this mistaken belief will have the behavioural outcome that
Twotto cannot find his destination. Hence, a propositional attitude that is
part of a subject’s cognition yet dependent entirely upon something outside
the brain proper can potentially have a substantial impact in the physical
domain. This altered conception of mind has potential effects far beyond
simple geographic epistemology; one can imagine it causing changes in
many other realms as well.
One such domain can be found in a foundational article in the field of
cognitive science written in 1950 by A. M. Turing. In it, Turing proposes
a test for artificial intelligence that is still in use today, albeit perhaps in
slightly modified forms. He begins by asking “Can machines think?” In
answer to this query, he proposes an “imitation game” from which roots the
leaves known today as the “Turing Test” have grown. Turing was less than
exact about the details of this test, on which the imitation game was based,
but which is not exactly the same; the game involved identifying which of
a pair of people–one man and one woman–was which. From this game,
Turing went on to describe different versions of what is now commonly
known as “the Turing Test”–in one version there were two entities (a
human and a computer) whereas a simpler version envisions just one
entity (which could alternately be human or a computer). Regardless, the
quintessential idea of the game is for an interrogator to attempt to discern,
by the responses to typed questions, whether the agent the interrogator
is interacting with is a machine or a human. If the interrogator cannot tell
the difference between the computer and a human, this is supposed to be
sufficient evidence that cognition is occurring within the computer.2
One of the strongest objections raised against the Turing Test was
proposed by John Searle and is known as the “Chinese Room” thought
experiment. Searle contends that cognition occurs solely within a mind
and, furthermore, the brain. The “Chinese Room” thought experiment
depends upon this assumption, which I will examine in the next section.
However, the thesis advanced by Clark and Chalmers undermines the
conclusion that cognition can take place only in a brain that Searle draws
from his now famous objection to the Turing Test. This diminishes the force
the “Chinese Room” argument exerted against the Turing Test as proof of
cognition.
The reluctance in some quarters to answer Turing’s original question
in the affirmative may stem from an anthropocentric conceit that the
thought processes exhibited by homo sapiens must be intrinsic to and
2 A note of gratitude to the anonymous peer reviewer whose annotations on this matter
added a degree of clarity previously lacking.
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inseparable from cognition, excluding by definition anything else from
being the same. For centuries, humanity has privileged its cognition
as special, as something that set it apart and above other forms of
computational/representational processing, be they lower organic forms
such as animals or, more recently, silicon-based forms such as calculators.
However, this may be changing; views such as those of Clark and
Chalmers are suggestive of this. Whether humanity is able to retain for
itself this privileged status is an important issue, not only because it
addresses foundational issues in the field of cognitive science but because
it goes beyond to the very nature of mind and further yet into the realm of
self-identity and what it means to be human.3
II.
Can machines think? Here I will examine in detail the arguments and
conclusions advanced by Searle in his text Minds, Brains, and Science
and the most salient arguments considered by Turing.
Much of the seminal paper in which Turing proposed the ‘imitation
game’ that gave rise to today’s Turing Test is devoted to an elaborate
description of the parameters of his discrete state machine or computer,
which seems somewhat irrelevant today, now that computers are
household objects. No one would suggest he was gripping stylistically
when reading these passages, but nevertheless, they are suggestive of
his prescient sense of their future import. Indeed, they are indicative of the
zeitgeist of the culture Turing was working in, one in which technology was
seen as a panacea to humanity’s ailments. Technology had just ended
one of the most devastating wars in history. If it could be made to think,
the possibilities must have seemed to Turing unbounded. Little wonder,
then, he postulated machine thought. He then considers objections made
by those answering his original question negatively. Some of these seem
unworthy of serious academic speculation sixty years later, such as the
theological objection or the argument from extra-sensory perception. At
least one, “the head-in-the-sand” objection never was worthy, although it is
indicative of a mode of thought that persists today to the point of becoming
quotidian, again reinforcing Turing’s uncanny ability to augur that which
has come to pass. Others, however, remain problematic, such as the Lady
Lovelace objection, which states that a computer is only able to produce
those answers it is programmed to produce.
Like Turing, Searle is interested in the question whether machines can
3 Self-identity in the wake of an advancing neuroscience threatening to render it
meaningless is one of the most important issues in the philosophy of mind, albeit
beyond the scope of this paper.
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think. In Minds, Brains, and Programs he formulates a thought experiment,
known today as the Chinese Room argument, which is still used as a
critique of “strong artificial intelligence.” He proposes that a computer
be built that can be queried with Chinese symbols, look them up in an
English rule book,4 and return a response in other Chinese symbols in a
manner sufficiently sophisticated to pass the Turing Test. This computer
would convince a native Chinese speaker that it spoke Chinese. However,
Searle proceeds to assert that, in theory, he could take the place of the
computer, and, given access to the same rule book, could perform the
same procedure. He notes that he does not actually understand a word
of Chinese. Thus, a computer can mimic intelligence, but it does not have
intentionality and thus can’t comprehend what it is doing. Computers are
merely symbol manipulators in Searle’s view.
The view advanced by Clark and Chalmers addresses directly what
Searle calls the “systems reply” to his Chinese Room thought experiment.
After presenting his thought experiment, Searle proceeds to consider
objections he believed some make in response to his intellectual offering,
detailing a number of possible objections to his thesis that computers
cannot think. The systems reply is of particular interest as it relates to
the internalism/externalism discourse; Searle writes,
While it is true that the individual person who is locked in the
room does not understand the story, the fact is that he is merely
part of a whole system, and the system does understand the
story. The person has a large ledger in front of him in which
are written the rules, he has a lot of scratch paper and pencils
for doing calculations, he has “data banks” of sets of Chinese
symbols. Now, understanding is not being ascribed to the mere
individual; rather it is being ascribed to this whole system of
which he is a part. (Searle 1980, 5)
If we accept the tenets of active externalism, we should also notice
the similarity between Otto and his notebook and Searle and his Chinese
Room and, furthermore, between Turing and his interrogator. If one
accepts that Otto’s notebook, upon use, becomes an extended, coupled
part of his mind, then it follows that one must accept that the material upon
which Searle’s rules are composed, upon use, become part of his mind.
4 It is interesting to note (as did an anonymous referee) that “tables” are often said to be
used to manipulate the proper symbol/word reference when in fact Searle never uses
the term; “book” and “ledger” are perhaps the closest analogue in his writing on the
subject.
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In the chapter of Minds, Brains, and Programs called “Can Computers
Think?” Searle details an argument which concludes that mental states
are biological phenomena. His premises are four-fold:
• Brains cause minds.
• Syntax is not sufficient for semantics.
• Computer programs are entirely defined by their formal, or
syntactical, structure.
• Minds have mental contents; specifically they have semantic
contents.
Searle himself concedes that the first premise is crudely formulated;
he proceeds to hone his meaning to the sharper phrasing that “mental
processes that we consider to constitute a mind are caused, entirely
caused, by processes going on inside the brain” (Searle 1984, 39). This is
true to an active externalist only if one removes that problematic caveat,
“entirely caused.” Active externalism allows for the causal role of factors
outside the brain, such as Otto’s notebook. It may also be the case that
a disjunction of this premise is also true: brains or (fill in the blank here)
cause minds.
Furthermore, should we adopt the active externalist paradigm, the third
and fourth premises also become problematic. In this paradigm, semantic
content of the mind extends beyond the traditional boundary of the head
and into the environment. Otto’s notebook becomes a part of his mind;
likewise, the rule books in the Chinese Room become a part of Searle’s
mind, enabling him, when he is actively coupled with them, to understand
the story. Thus if this reply is strengthened with active externalism, the
Chinese Room argument loses much of its force against machine thought.
III.
A common objection to active externalism, and indeed to the idea
of machine thought postulated by Turing, comes from the popular
identification of cognition with consciousness. The two are commonly
conflated. If it were the case that consciousness and cognition had some
type of identity relationship, then it seems implausible to imbue the laptop
that I type this on with consciousness, although cognition of a sort seems
within the realm of possibility, if not immediately, then in the future.
To make consciousness a necessary criterion for cognition seems
absurd in light of the fact that that there are many cognitive processes
that are not part of our conscious thought. One example is the priming
effect, well known to psychologists, where a subject asked to name a word
beginning with a particular letter is far more likely to name a word used
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in a sentence just prior to the task than a more common word. Whether
to make consciousness a necessary criterion for mind is a more difficult
question, but it is one left unaddressed by the Turing Test. Consciousness
is but one small part of that bundle of processes we gather together and
call “mind.”
Another argument advanced against the extended mind is the criterion
of portability. For something to qualify as a mind, it must be embodied
and able to bring its cognitive resources to bear upon different aspects
and locations of the environment. This is what keeps cognition in the
head. A related idea is what might be called the “decoupling” objection to
active externalism: coupling cognition with things in the environment in this
manner means that decoupling them is an easy matter, and so extended
cognition is not a logically necessary aspect of the cognitive process.
Portability is a more compelling objection to active externalism.
Nevertheless, so long as core cognition is reliably coupled with external
resources, this should not be an insurmountable problem. Our visual
systems, for example, rely on what Clark and Chalmers call “contingent
facts” about the environment to process what we see; an example is gestalt
effects. So long as the coupling is stable enough, the extended mind is
viable as a core cognitive process. In terms of machine thought, this is
one of those tricky criteria Turing sought to avoid addressing by instead
constructing a behavioural test. In this context, embodiment seems to be
unnecessary.
What Searle calls the systems reply to his thought experiment entails a
holistic view of the situation that arguably breaks with traditional notions
of personhood. However, the idea that the entire system understands
Chinese is entirely acceptable if we adopt the active externalist point of
view. Searle’s idea of intelligence is too narrow; active externalism allows
for cognition to occur outside of brains. Again, it is the stability of the
coupling that must be considered.
Finally, let us consider objections specifically related to the Chinese
Room. It may be that the element of intentionality is still lacking. Many
will be unwilling to grant semantic content to the Chinese Room and
its inhabitant. There is a certain gravitas about Searle’s aversion to the
“systems reply” in “Mind, Brains and Programs”; panpsychism, the notion
that mind is ubiquitous throughout the universe, potentially ensues should
we accept that the Chinese Room and its inhabitant understand Chinese
because we must grant other such coupled systems the same status of
mind, be they Deep Blue and a chess board or a monkey using pictographs
to signal hunger.
Regarding the objections involving intentionality and semantic content,
it seems there are two dichotomous responses: one can accept the
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Chinese Room and its inhabitant as an extended mind with semantic
content or one can deny the axioms of active externalism. The notion
of the nature and extent of cognition is changing; our ideas of mind
must adjust with it. However, this does not entail an acceptance of
traditional panpsychism; rather, new criteria for mind, such as degree of
complexity and processing power, self-reflexivity and adaptability, must be
established.
IV.
Machines, or computers, will at some point be able to pass the Turing
Test, especially if we adopt a view of mind such as the one proposed by
advocates of active externalism. Such a conceptualization accepts that
cognitive processes, and indeed mind, are extended into the environment
and are in many ways dependent upon it. One famous stumbling block for
machine thought in the past has been Searle’s “Chinese Room” thought
experiment. However, no longer are computers tripped up by this argument
since the extended mind obviates the Chinese Room objection to the
Turing Test. The Turing Test has proven of the years to be a fertile source
of intellectual innovation in the philosophy of mind. Perhaps other notions,





Burge, Tyler. 1979. Individualism and the Mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy
4: 73-121.
Clark, Andy, and David Chalmers. 1998. The Extended Mind. Analysis 58: 10-23.
Lau, Joe, and Max Deutsch. Externalism About Mental Content. Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
plato.stanford.edu/entries/content-externalism.
Putnam, Hilary. 1975. The Meaning of ‘’Meaning.” In Philosophical Papers,
Volume 2: Mind, Language and Reality, by Hilary Putnam, 216-71.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Seager, William, and Sean Allen-Hermanson. Panpsychism. Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. plato.stanford.edu/entries/panpsychism.
Searle, John R. 1984. Can Computers Think? In Minds, Brains, and Science,
28-41. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Searle, John R. 1980. Minds, Brains, and Programs. Behavioural and Brain
Sciences 3: 417-57.
Turing, Alan M. 1950. Computing Machinery and Intelligence. Mind: A Quarterly
Review of Psychology and Philosophy 59: 433-60.
Spontaneous Generations 4:1(2010) 137
